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Abstract— Small-scale fisheries (SSF) around the world are 
often organized in patron-client relationships (PC), where 
fishers deliver fish to a fishbuyer who sells it at regional 
markets. PCs have recently been criticized as being unequal, 
exploitative and unsustainable. Many governments have thus 
developed measures to promote fishing cooperatives. Despite 
these efforts, PC relationships appear to be increasing globally. 
The aim of our work is to shed light on why this social 
organization is very persistent. To this end we combine in depth 
empirical research on fishbuyers and fishers in an SSF in 
Mexico with agent-based modeling. This allows us to test 
hypotheses about the role of actor characteristics, such as their 
social skills, and the resources, as well as the institutional 
environment in which these interactions take place, for the 
establishment and persistence of PC relationships versus 
cooperatives. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
mall-scale fisheries around the world are often organized 
in patron-client relationships (hence forth PC), where a 
fishbuyer (the patron) provides loans to fishers (the clients) 
who in turn deliver their fish to the buyer who sells it at local 
or regional markets [1]. This relationship goes beyond the 
commercialization of the fish by providing monetary security 
and insurance to the fishers in times of personal needs or 
hardship. In recent years, they are being increasingly 
criticized as unequal, exploitative and unsustainable. Fish-
buyers can strongly influence the choices and actions of 
fishers because of the dependency of fishers’ livelihoods on 
their patron. It has been hypothesized that this relationship 
can contribute to overfishing as fish-buyers determine 
fishers’ target species and effort based on market demands 
rather than the condition of the fish population [1]. 
Governments around the world have thus introduced policies 
to foster the establishment of fishing cooperatives (hence 
forth Coops) as an attempt to move away from PC 
relationships towards more cooperative governance 
arrangements such as Coops. However, the introduction of 
Coops has often failed indicating a high resistance of PC 
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relationships. Globally, PC relationships within small-scale 
fisheries appear to be increasing. 
The aim of our work is to shed light on why this social 
organization is very persistent and which conditions could 
facilitate social change towards more cooperative, and 
possibly more sustainable, governance of small-scale fishers. 
The interplay of social and ecological factors and processes 
for shaping the dynamics of cooperation in natural resource 
management is a fundamental question underlying the 
development of sustainable social-ecological systems [2], 
[3]. To this end we address the question which social and 
ecological factors influence the evolution of a PC versus a 
Coop. We hypothesize that attributes of the fishers and 
fishbuyers, such as their social skills and reliability as well as 
the loyalty between a fisherman and his fishbuyer, or fishers 
within a Coop, are important factors for determining whether 
PC relationships or Coops will dominate a fishing 
community. We base these hypotheses on expert knowledge 
and extensive empirical research within fishing communities 
in Baja California, Mexico (e.g. [4]) as well as insights from 
the study of self-organization in common pool resource 
management [5].   
II. A MODEL OF SMALL-SCALE FISHERIES GOVERNANCE 
In the following we briefly describe the model following 
the overview section of the ODD+D protocol [6]. The 
purpose of the model is to enhance understanding of the 
social and ecological conditions that facilitate the 
establishment of cooperative governance arrangements in 
small-scale fisheries (such as Coops) versus the commonly 
found non-cooperative arrangements (fishers working for 
fishbuyers). The model has two types of human agents: 
fishers and fishbuyers, one ecological entity: a fish 
population and an economic entity: a fish market. Fishers can 
work with fishbuyers or form a Coop with other fishers. All 
agents are characterized by the attributes social skills, 
managerial skills, reliability and fishing skills, and the state 
variables financial capital and loyalty. The fish population is 
modeled using a standard logistic growth function. 
S 
The evolution of cooperative versus non-cooperative governance of 
small-scale fisheries 
Maja Schlüter, Emilie Lindkvist 
Stockholm Resilience Centre Stockholm University, 
11419 Stockholm, Sweden 
Email: {maja.schlueter, emilie.lindkvist}@su.se 
Xavier Basurto 
Nicholas School of the Environment, Duke University, 
USA 
Email: xavier.basurto@duke.edu 
  
Miguel, Amblard, Barceló & Madella (eds.) Advances in Computational Social Science and Social Simulation
Barcelona: Autònoma University of Barcelona, 2014, DDD repository <http://ddd.uab.cat/record/125597>
  
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 UML activity diagram of daily activities. A coop or a fishbuyer enter the fishery every 3 years. 
 
 
 
 
At selected intervals (e.g. every three years) the fisher 
with the highest financial capital can become a fishbuyer and 
start searching for fishers to work with him. Fishers will 
select a fishbuyer to work with based on his social skills and 
the price he offers. The fishbuyer will select a fisher to work 
with based on its reputation, which is a combination of its 
fishing skills and reliability. At every daily time step the 
buyer will assess whether he needs to increase or decrease 
the number of fishers he works with (see figure 1 for an 
overview of the scheduling of activities within a daily time 
step). If needed, he will get rid of the fisherman with lowest 
loyalty. A fisher will select a buyer that has expressed 
demand if he is not already working in a Coop. At the same 
interval five random fishers get together to form a Coop. The 
Coop provides the financial means to go fishing and sells the 
fish to the wholesale market. Fishers have to pay back the 
loan they received as well as a coop fee. Successful 
interactions between fishers in a Coop will increase the 
loyalty of the fisher to the Coop. 
Each day the fisher will get a loan from the fishbuyer or 
the Coop he is working with to go fishing. He fishes and the 
fish stock decreases. The fisher can sell his catch to the 
fishbuyer or bring it to the Coop respectively; or cheat and 
sell it to another fishbuyer offering a higher price. The 
decision to ‘cheat’ is based on the fisher’s reliability and its 
loyalty to the fishbuyer or cooperative. Loyalty between two 
agents increases with every successful interaction, i.e. when 
the fisher does not cheat, and decreases with cheating. A 
fishbuyer or Coop will sell all the received catch to the 
market and pay their fishers. Fishers pay back their loan if 
they did not cheat. Fishbuyers or coops whose budget goes 
below zero exit the fishery.  
The model was calibrated such that when keeping 
everything equal, e.g. no heterogeneity in skills, PC 
relationships and Coops had an equal chance of establishing. 
The model is also calibrated such that the fishery is 
sustainable when 50 fishers are actively fishing, i.e. they take 
out fish at a fixed effort, in a community of 100 potentially 
active fishers. 
To operationalize this question we develop an agent-based 
model (ABM) of fishers and fishbuyers in a small-scale 
fishing community to study the social and ecological 
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conditions, under which cooperative versus PC strategies can 
establish and persist. An ABM is suitable because it allows 
us to explore attributes of both individual fishers and the 
community in order to assess their relevance for the 
establishment of Coops. The study is innovative in that it 
studies natural resource use and management taking multiple 
levels of governance into account (fisher to fishbuyer to 
market versus Coop to market). This allows us to study the 
impact an intermediary level i.e. the fish-buyer (linking 
fishers to the market), has on the sustainability of a small-
scale fishery and the well-being of the community (see Crona 
et al. (2010) for an empirical investigation of the role of fish-
buyers in small-scale fisheries in Kenya). 
III. FIRST RESULTS – THE COEXISTENCE OF PC AND COOPS IN 
A COMMUNITY 
In the following we show first model explorations that 
investigate how PC and coops evolve. Under the given 
setting the number of fishers equilibrates around the 
sustainable level of 50 fishers with slightly more fishers in 
Coops than PC. At this point no more PC or Coops can 
successfully enter the fishery because they will not be able to 
earn enough to survive. Coops and PC however differ quite 
strongly in their loyalty. It grows strong in the Coops 
because they are persistent, i.e. they do not go out of 
business and form again as often as the PC. Particularly 
those that were in the fishery from the beginning can 
continuously build up loyalty while new ones are struggling 
which is visible in the fluctuations. The PCs fluctuate 
stronger and thus the loyalty of their fishers remains at a 
lower level. As a result of the social dynamics the fish stock 
converges to the optimal level (Figure 3, left); however the 
community, which had a rather equal distribution of wealth 
at the beginning, develops into a community with a high 
level of inequality (Figure 3, right).  
 
 
 
Fig. 2 Number of active fishers in PCs, Coops and the community (left); loyalty of PC and Coop fishers. Scenario settings correspond to the calibrated 
conditions of generating coexistence of PC and Coops. However, these scenarios include variable prices offered by the fishbuyers. The price acts as an 
incentive for cheating. Average of 10 runs, cheating depends on reliability only. 
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Figure 3: Size of the fish stock over time (left), Gini index (measure of inequality in the community) for PC, Coops and all active fishers in the 
community. Scenario settings as in Figure 2. 
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IV. DISCUSSION 
These preliminary results show the behavior of the model 
under very homogenous settings (all agents are initially the 
same) which is our basis to deploy the model to investigate 
the effects of social and ecological factors on the social 
structure of the fishing community and their consequences 
for the well-being of the community and the state of the fish 
population. These factors include agent attributes such as 
managerial skills, social skills and community attributes such 
as inequality in assets at the beginning of the simulation as 
well as ecological characteristics such as the growth rate of 
the fish population or fluctuations in fish abundance. The 
first results show the implications of variable price offered to 
the fishers on the generation of loyalty between fishers and 
fishers and fishbuyers. The model is consistent in its 
behavior and even with these very equal settings shows some 
interesting differences between PC and Coops that we will 
investigate further.  
The model builds strongly on empirical data and 
knowledge that informed the hypothesis, particularly which 
variables are considered relevant for explaining the 
performance of PC and Coops, as well as the model 
structure, parameterization and calibration. We for instance 
use information on the average number of fishbuyers in this 
community and the general level of cheating obtained from 
interviews with the main fishbuyer to calibrate the model. 
Extensive sensitivity analysis and the use of empirical data 
for validation (where possible) will be performed to test the 
robustness of the model. Already at this early stage the joint 
process of model building has sharpened the analytical 
approach to the case study and has raised numerous 
additional questions that will be addressed in future field 
work. The close cooperation between field experts and 
modelers was perceived by both as a very enriching 
experience, and a promising way forward, to address 
complex real world problems in these complex social-
ecological systems (SES). Ultimately we hope that our 
results contribute to understanding of social and ecological 
factors and their interactions that can keep SES trapped in a 
particular governance structure and to identifying leverage 
points for supporting the establishment of Coops in small-
scale fisheries around the world. 
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